I. INTRODUCTION
"Dropsy testimony" is testimony by a police officer, typically during a suppression hearing, claiming that a defendant dropped illegal drugs, "thus leaving them in plain view or abandoning them . . . ."
1 After the United States Supreme Court's 1961 landmark decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 2 in which the Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to the states, in addition to the federal government, there was a reported spike in police dropsy testimony. Irving Younger, former prosecutor, judge, and law professor, 3 explained the spike this way: Soon after Mapp, "police made the great discovery that if the defendant drops the narcotics on the ground, after which the policeman arrests him, the search is reasonable and the evidence is admissible." 4 The implication was that police were distorting the truth to prevent judges from suppressing inculpatory evidence and to save their drug cases from eventual dismissal. 5 In Kansas, there may be a more modern-day type of dropsy testimony designed to justify pretextual drug investigations of out-ofstate cars with Hispanic drivers. A stop is "pretextual" when officers use * Associate Professor, the University of Kansas School of Law. My sincerest thanks go to Christopher R. Drahozal, Jelani Jefferson Exum, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, and L.M. Reeves for providing thoughtful and constructive comments on an earlier draft. I also owe many thanks to my talented research assistants Josh A. Bender and Chris Grenz. motion to suppress the contraband, 14 the officer testifies to his reason for the stop-"you crossed the fog line," "drifted from your lane of travel," or "failed to maintain a single lane." The officer typically makes no mention of the reasons for selecting this particular car for careful scrutiny. As long as an officer has a legally sufficient reason to stop a car, his ulterior motives in a given case are viewed as irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 15 This Article urges readers to stand back from any one particular fogline case, in which it appears that an officer acted diligently and perceptively, uncovering a significant crime during a standard traffic stop, and to look for patterns emerging from a series of cases. From this multi-case perspective, it seems that fog-line stops may be nothing more than a pretext for drug investigations. Some of these pretextual stops probably follow from an actual traffic infraction. Other fog-line stops may amount to a new type of police dropsy testimony in that Kansas police come to federal court and offer a post-hoc justification for an otherwise unlawful search that, nevertheless, uncovered contraband. Given the limited data, there is no way to know whether Kansas police are engaging in lawful, but controversial, pretextual stops or, conversely, dishonestly claiming to witness lane drifts that never occurred. In either event, Kansas officers (consciously or subconsciously) appear to be acting on unreliable stereotypes, such as skin color and out-of-state status, in deciding which cars to stop and investigate.
In making a case for increased attention to fog-line (and similar) traffic stops, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part II examines data from orders recently decided in the District of Kansas to show, circumstantially, that Kansas police are using fog-line violations as a ruse to stop out-of-state cars driven by people of Hispanic ethnicity. Part III summarizes the law relevant to pretextual fog-line traffic stops, including federal and state law governing Kansas police. Finally, Part IV offers a few observations about why Kansas police should try harder to avoid pretextual fog-line stops.
II. RECENT JUDICIAL ORDERS FROM THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
This Article is informed by my review of criminal orders deciding motions to suppress evidence issued recently by federal trial judges in 
17
During the applicable time period, the court decided thirty-five motions to suppress. 18 A list of these thirty-five orders, with accompanying case names, numbers, and other pertinent information, follows this Article as an appendix. Of the court's thirty-five orders, nine (about 26%) involved evidence seized during a traffic stop, as compared to evidence uncovered during the search of a home or office, or the search of a car for reasons other than a traffic violation. In five of the nine traffic stops (approximately 56%), Kansas police cited a fog-line infraction or similar lane drift as the reason for the stop. 19 Although Kansas police purportedly stopped all five vehicles for leaving their lane of travel, when considered as a group, officers appeared to have a different reason for each of the stops. While the sample size is admittedly small, the 16 . The orders can be accessed at http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/ under the Recent Opinions link.
17. In theory, the 476 number would represent every order issued in a criminal case during the specified time because the website is designed to provide access to all publically-available orders from the court. But information obtained from the Clerk's Office, United States District Court for the District of Kansas, indicates that each judge's chambers is responsible for posting its own orders. Therefore, if there is human error in publishing the orders to the website, the errors will result in fewer than all orders on the site. As a result, it is likely that judges in the District of Kansas issued more than 476 criminal orders in the given time period. In addition, sealed orders are unavailable by definition.
18. This number reflects all of the motions to suppress that are available on the court's website in the approximately thirteen-month period. Occasionally, a defendant filed a motion to reconsider a motion to suppress. These motions for reconsideration are also included in the count of orders on motions to suppress. orders are informative. They show a pattern-in all five cases, Kansas police targeted out-of-state cars driven by people of Hispanic ethnicity so that they could obtain the occupants' permission to search the vehicles for drugs.
20

A. Recent Pretextual Police Stops in Kansas
During the thirteen months reviewed, at least nine minor traffic infractions ultimately resulted in felony criminal cases in federal court. In eight of those nine traffic-stop cases (approximately 89%), the defendants appear to have been of Hispanic ethnicity. 21 In five of the nine cases, the federal criminal case began with a lane violation, and 100% of the defendants and the other occupants of the vehicles in those lane-violation cases appear to have been Hispanic. The defendants and other occupants include: Jose Maldonado; Gonzalo Maldonado and Manuel Garcia; Felipe Perales; Luis Diaz and Stephen Demalleo; and Julian Rocha, Ericka Rocha, and Gerardo Gaxiola.
22
The high percentage of Hispanic defendants stands out because Kansas has a relatively small Hispanic and Latino population. In 2008, the population of Kansas was approximately 2,802,134, and persons of Hispanic or 20. I wondered how officers could see into cars from significant distances to select certain drivers. An interview of a current federal public defender in the District of Kansas revealed that often the police pull up beside a car before falling back and activating the patrol car's lights or siren, signaling for the citizen driver to pull over. 21. By Hispanic, I mean to suggest ancestral ties to Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, or South or Central America. This observation rests primarily on the names of the defendants, each of whom was identified by a common Hispanic surname. But in some cases, the ethnicity of the defendant was confirmed by his own pleading (usually a brief in support of the motion to suppress), the judge's order, or the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress. (When readily available, these court documents were accessed through Pacer.) For instance, in the case of defendant Perales, the judge's order, which denies the defendant's motion to suppress, implies that the defendant's primary language is Spanish, supporting the inference that he is of Hispanic ethnicity. See Perales, 2008 WL 4974807, at *2 (noting that during a post-arrest interview of the defendant, an agent who is "fluent in Spanish" was available, but not needed, to interpret). In United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, the judge's order indicates that the driver of the vehicle spoke little English, supporting the inference that the defendant is Hispanic. See 2009 WL 2760798, at *1. In the case of Jose Maldonado, the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress reveals cross-examination questions from the defendant's lawyer confirming that the defendant's ethnicity is Hispanic and references to the defendant's "limited knowledge of the English language." Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. And, in the case of Julian Rocha, the court found that the occupants of the recreational vehicle did not have "trouble speaking or understanding English. at 65-66 (noting that the Wichita Police Department was taking measures to "fight against racial/ethnic profiling" which were paying off and that stops of Hispanics were "at the lower range of the benign area").
26. In three of the five cases, the officer was a member of the Kansas Highway Patrol. In one, the officers worked for the Wichita Police Department. In the remaining case, the officer was an employee of the Shawnee County Sheriff's Office.
27. This law provides that when a roadway is divided into two clearly marked lanes of traffic, "[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." KAN. STAT Diaz. Demalleo and Diaz, described in the judge's order as two welldressed men, were driving from Denver, returning to Missouri, where the men had rented a car for the trip. Gonzalo Maldonado, with Manuel Garcia as his passenger, was stopped by the Kansas Highway Patrol on his way from Sacramento, California to Kansas City. 29 In each case studied, after an officer questioned the occupants and checked their driver's licenses and the car's registration, the officer returned the documents and took "a couple of steps back towards the patrol car" 30 before re-engaging the occupants to ask more questions.
31
In each of the five fog-line cases, the officers' follow-up questions were directed at uncovering evidence of drug trafficking. For instance, in the case involving defendants Gonzalo Maldonado and Garcia, the officer asked "whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle, such as 'cervesa,' 'pistoles,' drugs, or illegal aliens." 32 In the case of defendant Rocha, the officer asked whether there were "any drugs or contraband." ) (noting that the deputy returned all of the occupants' documents and gave the driver a warning ticket for failing to maintain a single lane of travel before telling the driver "thank you" and stepping aside before returning to ask whether the driver "had any drugs or contraband").
31. Presumably, the officers ended the stop by returning the documents and telling the occupants they were free to leave because a seizure that is lawful at its inception may become unconstitutional ( Taking the fog-line cases as a whole, the officers' issuance of warnings rather than tickets appears designed to take advantage of human nature. 36 A warning causes the driver to relax and to feel grateful to the officer. Sensing an opportunity to circumvent the need for probable cause, the officer then asks the driver for consent. 37 The driver, now feeling like he owes the officer something in return for the simple warning, agrees to the search. Especially in cases involving people whose first language is not English, the colloquy seems destined to end in a search, regardless of whether voluntary and knowing consent is given.
38
The officers' intent to conduct a search is, perhaps, best illustrated in the one case (of the five) that occupants refused to continue to answer the officer's questions and never consented to a search. In United States v. 34 . In four cases the officer asked for permission to search. In the fifth case, the defendant began to drive away before the officer could ask.
35. In the case of defendant Felipe J. Perales, the district court noted that the defendant answered the trooper's questions about drugs "without difficulty communicating." Perales, 2008 WL 4974807, at *2. In the case of Jose Maldonado, the court noted that the defendant's silence in the face of police questioning may have been due to "his limited knowledge of the English language." Jose Maldonado, F. Supp. 2d at 1183. And, in the case of Gonzalo Maldonado and Manuel Garcia, the officer was told by the passenger that the driver "did not 38. The fact that an officer requested permission to search in four of the five fog-line cases is notable because officers do not ask to search during every traffic stop. For instance, data collected in 2000 from the Wichita Police Department indicated that their officers conducted searches in only about 12.5% of car stops and that many of these searches were justified as incident to the arrest of the car's occupants. WITHROW, supra note 28, at Executive Summary. The Wichita study also revealed that while Wichita Police did not stop a disproportionate number of Hispanic drivers, both black and Hispanic citizens were more likely to be searched than were non-black and non-Hispanic persons. Id.
Diaz, an officer stopped a Chrysler, reporting that the car crossed over the center line by at least six inches, at least twice. 39 After checking the driver's and passengers' paperwork, the officer returned the documents and issued a warning for the infractions. 40 Then, the officer "took a couple of steps back towards his patrol car and heard the gear selector shift." 41 Hearing the driver begin to leave, the officer asked "if he could ask some more questions [,] " but the driver refused, saying "we're done."
42 Intent on searching the car, the officer ordered the driver to "take the keys out of the ignition, hand them over . . . and put the car in park." 43 The officer then called another officer to bring a drug dog to the scene to sniff for drugs. 44 In other words, in all five of the fog-line cases, the officers appeared to be looking for drugs without probable cause to believe that drugs would be present in these particular vehicles. 45 Sometimes it took more than one search.
46
Sometimes it took an extended period of time. 48. See United States v. Diaz, No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664, at *1 (after officers returned occupants' documents and indicated defendants could leave, officer directed driver to put the car in park and step out).
49. Of course, these cases provide no insight into the number of cars with Hispanic occupants that were searched but revealed no contraband. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 the evidence after finding that the officers violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights on the way to uncovering the evidence. In Diaz, the judge granted the defendants' 50 joint motion to suppress crystal methamphetamine and other drug-related evidence. 51 Although the judge determined that the initial stop was legally justified by the fog-line violation, he also ruled that after the officer issued the defendants a warning citation, "Diaz did not agree to further questioning and was ordered [without reasonable cause] to put the car in park and surrender the keys."
52 Because the additional questioning and continued seizure of car and occupants was neither consensual nor supported by reasonable suspicion, the Kansas officer violated the Fourth Amendment by continuing to detain the car so that he could subject it to a drug-dog sniff and subsequent search.
In United States v. Jose Maldonado, another district court judge granted the defendant's motion to suppress methamphetamine and cocaine. 53 At the hearing on the motion, officers claimed that they stopped Maldonado because he committed a lane violation. The judge suppressed the evidence after finding that one officer's testimony was not credible. The judge explained:
The government argues that the officers had probable cause to stop the vehicle because the left side tires of Maldonado's vehicle drifted over the center line on at least one occasion, and he was weaving within his own lane. However, prior to the alleged drifting of Maldonado's vehicle, Officer Cooper testified that the only reason he initially followed Maldonado was because he had a Texas license plate. Indeed, he was parked on an exit ramp and pulled onto the roadway for that reason alone. And, this is the only portion of Officer Cooper's testimony that the court finds credible. "YOU CROSSED THE FOG LINE!" 1189 stops are based on actual or phantom violations, the data suggests that Kansas officers are relying on these infractions to stop a disproportionate number of Hispanic drivers of out-of-state cars.
B. The Deceptively Attractive Nature of Fog-line Violations
While in five of nine traffic stops, officers cited a fog-line violation as the reason for the stop, 55 fog-line stops were much more likely to result in the suppression of evidence than were other traffic infractions or other cases based on traditional probable cause. In the thirteen-month period studied, judges in the District of Kansas denied 29 of 35 (83%) of motions to suppress, thus allowing the introduction of contraband against the defendants in each of those cases. 56 Of thirty-five motions, judges granted only three outright and granted, in part, another three. 57 Nevertheless, in fog-line cases, judges granted the defendants' motions in two of five cases. 58 In other words, despite the extensive leeway the law gives officers to make traffic stops for even the smallest traffic infraction, 59 in 40% (two of five) of the federal cases in which Kansas police relied on a fog-line violation to justify such a stop, the District Court of Kansas ruled that officers had overreached and violated the federal Constitution in their vigor to uncover a more serious crime. 60 In Fourth Amendment parlance, the officers acted "unreasonably." Thus, whether consciously or subconsciously, Kansas federal district court judges expressed disfavor of fog-line cases through their rulings on motions to suppress evidence.
Unless officers are aware that fog-line cases have met with successful motions to suppress a disproportionately large percentage of the time, "fog-line testimony" might seem to be an ideal justification for a stop. When the driver of a car violates a traffic law, even a very minor one, the violation gives the police reasonable grounds to "seize" the car. 61 A legal stop gives the officer an opportunity to look in and smell
See supra note 19 (citing nine District of Kansas cases involving traffic stops).
56. See Appendix infra (citing thirty-five motions, twenty-nine of which were denied). 57. See Appendix infra (citing thirty-five motions, three of which were granted outright, and another three which were granted in part).
58. 63 it is conceivable that nervousness alone may effectively "force" many drivers, especially minorities and people who are generally fearful of police, to veer, at least a little, from their lane of travel when they normally would have no trouble maintaining a single lane.
From a proof standpoint, a fog-line violation would seem to be ideal for the prosecution. Such violations require no special evidence, no forensics or video proof. Whereas speeding violations are typically accompanied by radar evidence, and driving under the influence violations are proven by breathalyzer or blood/alcohol proof, fog-line violations typically are established by the officer's testimony alone. Even when an officer provides video to support the stop, the traffic violation is usually missing from the video. 64 The officer often activates the camera by turning on his lights or siren, after the alleged infraction. Even tag violations and infractions for following too closely would probably be visible in the video, unlike lane drifts. 63. Following a car or individual is not a search or seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment. 64. For instance, in the case of Julian Rocha, the officer's car was equipped with a video camera but none of the three alleged fog-line violations was captured on the video, supposedly because the video was turned on only after the traffic violations, when the officer activated the emergency lights on the police car. Nevertheless, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the video actually began when the RV was already stopped. Rocha, 2008 WL 4498950, at *2. Nevertheless, the judge deemed the evidence sufficient to deny the defendant's motion to suppress. Id. at *6.
2010] "YOU CROSSED THE FOG LINE!" 1191
The lack of tangible evidence of fog-line infraction makes them uniquely difficult to refute. An officer's word would appear to be more than adequate to establish reasonable suspicion by the applicable preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof. 65 Because most of Kansas is flat and breezy, it is easy to believe that a car left its lane of travel, even if it did not. A defendant who contradicts an officer's testimony with a claim that he or she did not cross the fog line does little more than generate images of childhood disputes-"Yes, you did. No, I did not. Yes, you did!" When there is no independent evidence to contradict an officer's sworn testimony, 66 there is no reason for the judge to doubt the officer's credibility, especially considering that the judge now knows that contraband was found in the car (or on the defendant) and that application of the exclusionary rule will, in all likelihood, doom the government's case. 67 Particularly for defendants facing serious charges, their inherently-biased testimony is highly unlikely to overcome an officer's version of events.
Because fog-line violations are easy to believe and difficult to refute, unscrupulous officers might be tempted to adopt them as a favorite explanation for traffic stops, particularly when they do not have other reasonable grounds to believe that the car's occupants are committing a crime. Even if Kansas police do not distort the truth, claiming phantom fog-line violations, officers appear to pre-select certain drivers and then use fog-line infractions to justify pretextual drug investigations.
III. THE APPLICABLE LAW
Supreme Court precedent and evolving law in both the Tenth Circuit and the state courts of Kansas encourage officers to rely on fog-line violations as grounds to subject a car to a traffic stop. The United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have given police extensive discretion to conduct pretextual stops for all types of traffic infractions, and the Tenth Circuit and Kansas appellate courts permit officers to prove fog-line infractions with cursory testimony. 66. Typically, the only witnesses to the traffic stop and subsequent search will be the police and the occupants of the car.
67. In both fog-line cases in which the court granted the defendant's motion to suppress, the government later dismissed the case, presumably because evidence was lacking to proceed to trial. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
A. United States Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court's holdings in Delaware v. Prouse 68 and Whren v. United States 69 inform any discussion of whether police have acted legally when "seizing" a car or truck in a traffic stop and subsequently subjecting both vehicle and occupants to an investigation, related or unrelated to the officer's purported reason for the stop. 70 In Prouse, the Court declared it "unreasonable," and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment, 71 for a police officer to seize a car without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe "that the car is being driven contrary to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles or that either the car or any of its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation of any other applicable law." 72 The officer in Prouse violated the Fourth Amendment because he stopped a car without observing any traffic or equipment violation or any other suspicious activity.
73
The stop was held to be an unconstitutional intrusion on Fourth Amendment freedoms after the officer forthrightly admitted that he "saw the car in the area and wasn't answering any complaints," so he chose to stop the car. 74 The mandate of the Prouse decision was clear. In the run-of-the-mill case, 75 police need "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the driver or occupants of the car are violating a law before they can legally conduct a stop. 76 Unbridled police discretion to stop any car, at any time, even in the interest of public safety, is a breach of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court later explained Prouse: "The officer's 68. 440 U.S. 648 (1979 The defendants in Whren had argued that civil traffic regulations should be treated differently than instances in which probable cause or reasonable suspicion rests on other, more significant grounds. They contended:
[T]he use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation. This creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists.
80
The Court rejected this argument and confirmed that breach of a simple traffic regulation can provide an officer with reasonable grounds for a stop, regardless of the real motives of the police for choosing a particular car. 81 After Whren, police still need an articulable and reasonable basis to conduct a traffic stop, but any "civil traffic violation" can suffice to create that reason. 82 It is legally irrelevant that an officer uses a traffic violation to investigate his or her hollow hunches that a driver is committing a more serious offense, such as drug trafficking. 83 Thus, reading Prouse with Whren illustrates that while a police officer cannot stop every car she chooses just because she has a "feeling" that a stop will expose a crime, she is authorized to seize a car and its passengers any time the officer sees a traffic violation or has other reasonable grounds to believe that the car violated a rule of the road. 
B. Tenth Circuit Precedent
The Tenth Circuit's version of Whren and its application of fog-line statutes in states within the circuit encourage Kansas police to cite lane drifts as grounds for a traffic stop.
The Tenth Circuit's Version of Whren
For about a decade before the decision in Whren, Tenth Circuit 86 precedent protected citizens against pretextual government searches and seizures. Noting that pretextual stops "permit arbitrary intrusions [risking that] thousands of everyday citizens who violate minor traffic regulations would be subject to unfettered police discretion as to whom to stop," the Tenth Circuit declared that pretextual stops by individual officers were "unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
87 While recognizing that "requiring at least a minor traffic offense" provides "some objective limitation on police intrusions," the Tenth Circuit, at that time, found such limits too meager. 88 Instead, the court evaluated pretextual stops by asking "whether under the same circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose."
89 If a reasonable officer would have been uninterested in pursuing the traffic violation absent the hope of finding drugs, other contraband, or some other serious violation of law, then the seizure and search were deemed unconstitutional. Pursuant to the new standard, "a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." 92 The new rule made it "irrelevant" that an officer held a subjectively improper motive in addition to an objectively valid basis for a stop. 93 The Tenth Circuit said: "Our sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated 'any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations' of the jurisdiction."
94
The Tenth Circuit insisted that despite the change in position, citizens were adequately protected against arbitrary police intrusion on privacy and liberty because "if an officer's initial traffic stop, though objectively justified by the officer's observation of a minor traffic violation, is motivated by a desire to engage in an investigation of more serious criminal activity, his investigation . . . will be circumscribed by In United States v. Tang, the Tenth Circuit held that a single, but significant, fog-line violation by the driver of a U-Haul was sufficient reason for an officer to stop the U-Haul. 98 The stop in Tang occurred around 10:00 p.m. 99 It was a dark night, on a stretch of road with no street lights or moonlight. 100 There was a "mild to moderate wind."
101
At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that he saw the defendant's U-Haul "cross over the right side fog line" and remain there for two hundred to three hundred yards.
102
After the lane drift, the officer followed the U-Haul another mile, but the U-Haul did not leave its lane again. 103 Despite the isolated lane violation and the mile with no other infractions, the officer stopped the U-Haul. 104 In testimony, the officer admitted that "it is common for people to drive over the line on the freeway," but said that this violation was different because of "the time of night and length of time [defendant]'s vehicle was over the fog line." 105 The trial judge found that the officer testified "credibly and truthfully" and denied the defendant's motion to suppress. 106 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit ruled that because there were no unusual weather or road conditions that made it impractical to remain entirely within a single lane of traffic, the officer acted lawfully in stopping the U-Haul. 107 Fourth Amendment terms, the stop was "reasonable," so it complied with the Constitution. In United States v. Alvarado, the Tenth Circuit increased the attractiveness of fog-line violations as a basis for a traffic stop, ruling that one incident of driving across the fog line by "about a foot" for "a few seconds" gave the police sufficient reason to stop the car. 108 In Alvarado, a Utah 109 Highway Patrol Trooper testified that a Jeep Cherokee crossed about one foot over the right fog line of the highway and remained there for a few seconds despite "ideal driving conditions," including a sunny day, no wind, and a straight and flat stretch of road, which was dry and without pot holes or debris. 110 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that "there were no adverse weather or road conditions that might have made it impractical for Alvarado to prevent his vehicle from drifting out of the righthand lane and over the fog line."
111 On its way to concluding that the trooper "had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Alvarado, by crossing one foot over the fog line, had violated [Utah's] § 41-6-61(1)," 112 the Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that a typical driver "'operating a motor vehicle at or near interstate speed limits has a difficult task of operating the vehicle entirely within a single lane for the entirety of his trip.'" 113 In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Tenth Circuit explained that under its precedent, the determination is "a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present during the incident in question in order to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway." 114 Consistent with its ruling that a single violation of a fog-line statute can create reasonable suspicion or probable cause sufficient to subject a (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that reasonable grounds for a traffic stop existed when an officer saw a truck swerve onto the shoulder of the road and almost hit a bridge abutment).
108 Although the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Kansas fog-line statute was "susceptible to rather arbitrary application by law enforcement officers," the court decided that on the particular facts of the case, the trooper "had probable cause to stop Mr. Ozbirn."
117
As the Tenth Circuit acknowledged, fog-line violations offer the police extensive discretion to enforce the traffic laws arbitrarily.
118 Not only is every driver certain to violate a single-lane requirement on occasion, 119 but especially in Kansas, which often experiences windy conditions, it may sometimes be physically impossible to drive entirely within a single lane. 120 Moreover, because an officer's assertion that such a violation occurred is difficult, if not impossible, for a driver to refute with his own competing testimony, traffic stops for fog-line violations give the police infinite opportunities to pick and choose which drivers and cars they will stop. It appears that any thoughtful officer could follow a car long enough to spot a fog-line violation, or convince herself that the car and driver seem suspicious and that the officer would be justified in claiming such an infraction.
Some of the proof that police can and do pick and choose among drivers when they decide to enforce a fog-line statute is supported by the facts of the Tenth Circuit cases reporting such violations. In case after case, an officer stops a vehicle for drifting from its lane of traffic, but rather than ticket the driver or undertake an investigation directed at ensuring that the driver is not falling asleep or otherwise incapable of maintaining her lane, the officer embarks on an obvious attempt to investigate the driver and car for drug violations or other, similarly serious crimes. In case after case, the police offer the driver a warning before momentarily leaving the driver and then "reconnecting" to ask more questions and, ultimately, requesting permission to search for contraband. Typically, the nature and subject matter of the officer's questions show that the officer cares nothing about a lane violation and everything about possible drug trafficking.
For example, in United States v. Gregory, an officer testified that the defendant was not cited for a traffic violation but that during his interaction with the driver, he became suspicious that the vehicle contained contraband; therefore, the officer asked if the defendant was "carrying any illegal substances in the truck" and then "if he could take a look." 121 Ultimately, a search of the defendant's rented U-Haul uncovered marijuana and cocaine in plastic garbage bags in the trailer portion of the truck. 122 In United States v. Alvarado, the trooper "gave Alvarado a written warning for crossing the fog line, returned Alvarado's documents, and told him 'you're free to leave, drive safely,'" before returning to the defendant's vehicle and asking the driver more questions and "for permission to search the vehicle." 123 The subsequent search of the defendant's Jeep revealed "illegal narcotics hidden in the rear." 124 In United States v. Ozbirn, the trooper "finished issuing [a] warning" and then "asked Mr. Ozbirn if he could ask him a few more questions." 125 This colloquy was followed by an inquiry about whether the defendant was "hauling any illegal guns, drugs, weapons, or other contraband," after which Mr. Ozbirn reportedly "invited" the trooper to look inside his motor home. 126 Packets of marijuana were eventually discovered. 127 In United States v. Pulido-Vasquez, it was a similar story.
128 A Kansas highway patrol trooper issued the driver a warning, returned his "documentation," told the driver he was free to go, and then asked the driver and the passenger "for permission to search the vehicle for drugs." 129 Sheriff's Deputy stopped a "'box-type' rental moving truck" for failing to maintain a single lane of traffic. 130 Then, the deputy returned the driver's license and rental truck agreement, gave her a warning, and told her she was free to leave. 131 Immediately thereafter, the deputy "asked if he could ask a few more questions" and then gained permission to look in the truck. 132 A subsequent search of the moving truck led officers to find "twenty bundles of marijuana." 133 The fact that fog-line cases regularly involve an officer's transparent attempt to move quickly from discussing the traffic infraction to a search of the vehicle or occupants for drugs, guns, or other criminal violations strongly suggests, at least circumstantially, that police select certain cars and drivers as a pretext to investigate those cars and their occupants, not for fog-line violations, as they claim, but for more serious crimes for which the police lack any reasonable grounds to stop or search the car. Because in case after case, the police issue no citation for fog-line infractions, which supposedly prompted the stops, it seems unlikely that police view such violations as significant. In addition, because in each stop, the police seek permission to search after quickly dismissing the fog-line citation, the real motivation appears to be the search, not the ticket or the safety concern regarding the driver's failure to maintain a lane.
C. Kansas State Law
In Kansas, K.S.A. section 8-1522 is the "fog-line statute," prohibiting drivers from committing lane violations. It provides that when a roadway is divided into two clearly marked lanes of traffic, " [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." 134 In the past two years, the Kansas Court of Appeals struggled to find a unified position regarding the type of conduct that creates reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that section 8-1522(a) has been breached. As discussed below in part C.2., the Kansas Supreme Court recently resolved the tension within the Kansas Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, the history of the appellate decisions showcases why Kansas officers 136 The panel explained further: "'As nearly as practicable' connotes something less than the absolute. Automobiles are not railway locomotives. They do not run on fixed rails." 137 The panel said that cars are permitted to move from a single lane "after first determining it is safe to do so." 138 The panel concluded that whether reasonable suspicion exists for a traffic stop turns on whether "the totality of the circumstances . . . make it appear to the officer that not only did the defendant's vehicle move from its lane of travel, but it left its lane when it was not safe to do so."
139
Applying the facts to its announced interpretation of section 8-1522(a), the panel in Ross decided that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for a stop.
140
There was no testimony that there was any obstacle or barrier on the shoulder that presented an immediate danger. There was no testimony that sand, gravel, or debris on the shoulder presented a hazard to a motorist who directed his or her vehicle onto the shoulder. There was not testimony that [the officer] was concerned that the driver might have been falling asleep or was intoxicated. [The driver's] vehicle was not weaving back and forth on the roadway. He was not using the paved shoulder as a regular lane of travel. He crossed the fog line only briefly, for only a short distance, and only once. In short, there was no reasonable suspicion that [the driver] was engaged in the conduct that is at the heart of the statute: moving a vehicle from its lane of travel without first ascertaining that it could be done safely.
141
Less than a year after the decision in Ross, a different three-judge panel (consisting of Judges Greene, Malone, and Leben) interpreted the same statute in a contrary way, expressly "declin[ing] to follow the Ross court's interpretation."
142 In State v. Marx, the government appealed from the trial court's ruling granting the defendants' motions to suppress.
143 A sheriff's deputy had relied on K.S.A. section 8-1522 in stopping the defendants' motor home for failure to maintain a single lane. 144 The officer said he stopped the vehicle "after he saw it cross the fog line, overcorrect, and cross the centerline."
145 After the stop, the deputy obtained and checked the occupants' licenses and vehicle registration, confirmed they were valid, and handed the documentation and a warning ticket to the occupants before telling the driver that she "was free to leave." 146 The deputy then asked the driver if she would answer a few more questions, asked if the motor home concealed drugs, and asked for permission to search it.
147
When the driver refused consent, the deputy told her that he intended to use a drug dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle.
148
The driver then entered the motor home against the directives of the deputy and, apparently, began disposing of illegal drugs in the home's septic tank.
149
The appellate panel in Marx found ample reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly declined to follow the Ross court's interpretation of section 8-1522(a), explaining: "The 'nearly as practicable' language allows a driver to momentarily move outside a lane of traffic due to special circumstances such as weather conditions or an obstacle in the road. Otherwise, the driver must As for who must establish the "special circumstances" causing the car to drift, the panel said: "[I]f there was a special circumstance such as an obstacle in the road which caused [the driver] to swerve the motor home, it would seem that this is evidence only she could provide. The State is not required to prove a negative." Combined, Ross and Marx demonstrate that when Marx was decided, six of the thirteen judges on the Kansas Court of Appeals were evenly divided on what it meant to commit a fog-line violation, which, in turn, gives an officer a legal basis to stop a car and conduct additional investigation in a face-to-face environment, offering police the chance to ask probing questions and for permission to search. Three judges seemed to think almost any drift was enough; three others wanted to require a lane drift plus a safety inquiry.
As a practical matter, the reasoning and holding in Ross made fogline violations significantly less attractive as a pretext to stop cars for ulterior reasons. Following Ross, an officer could not just cite a minor lane drift to explain a stop; rather, she had to explain in a credible and logical way why there were reasonable grounds to think the driver acted unsafely. This more detailed and extended testimony offered fodder for cross-examination of the officer. If the officer's narrative explanation was unconvincing, the judge might reject the officer's testimony and suppress the evidence. In contrast, under Marx, any reasonably competent officer could credibly articulate a lane drift as grounds for a traffic stop because no other explanation was needed. Such a cursory and conclusory bit of testimony would be almost impossible to refute through cross-examination or otherwise.
Less than two years after joining the decision in Marx, Judge Greene wrote a dissenting opinion in State v. Tinoco, indicating that he had changed his mind about fog-line violations. In Tinoco, Judge Greene The result of the majority's decision is to license stops for conduct that is occasionally, if not routinely, exhibited by nearly every driver on the road. I would put a stop to such stops. Unless the driver exhibits conduct like that in Marx, we should not sanction any deprivation of liberty.
154
Although Tinoco allowed Judge Greene to express his new preference for Ross, the decision gave two other appellate judges an opportunity to distance themselves from the reasoning in the Ross decision.
155
Although Judges Pierron 156 and Standridge concluded that the defendant's appeal probably failed under the holding of either Ross or Marx, they emphasized that the appellate court "has declined to follow Ross in its more recent decision [Marx] ." 157 The two judges further noted that "Tenth Circuit cases that were decided after Ross ha The court sought to "intuit the most logical meaning to ascribe to this legislative language." 162 After parsing the statute, the court concluded that section 8-1522(a) establishes "two separate rules of the road." 163 The first rule "requires a driver to keep entirely within a single lane while traveling on a roadway with two or more clearly marked lanes," but this rule is "temporarily suspended when it becomes impracticable to stay within the lane markers and when the driver is properly effecting a lane change." 164 Therefore, " [p] roof that driving outside the lane markers created no safety hazard is not a defense to the single lane rule." 165 The safety issue arises, according to the Kansas Supreme Court, only in the second instance.
The second rule provides that before a driver may change lanes or move from the current lane of travel to another location, he or she must ascertain that the movement can be made with safety. A traffic infraction occurs under K.S.A. 8-1522(a) when either rule of the road is violated. Turning to whether the facts of the Marx case gave the officer reasonable grounds to conduct a stop, the court noted that "K.S.A. 8-1522(a) is not a strict liability offense" and that the "as nearly as practicable" language in the statute "contradicts the notion that any and all intrusions upon the marker lines of the chosen travel lane constitute a violation." 168 The court acknowledged that weather conditions and obstacles in the road could make it impracticable to maintain a single lane of traffic and then went further: "[T]he statute even dilutes the practicability standard. It does not say 'when practicable' a vehicle will be driven entirely within a single lane. Accordingly, after the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Marx, to justify a stop, an officer need not provide an explanation about how the fog-line drift created danger, a relatively tough standard, probably requiring a significant amount of explanation. 172 However, an officer must be able to explain why it was feasible, given the circumstances, for the driver to stay within the lane markers.
173
While requiring some explanation, the standard adopted by the court will probably be met whenever an officer credibly testifies that there was little wind, no road obstructions, and a relatively straight stretch of road.
174 This type of testimony will allow some opportunity for a talented cross-examiner to reveal inconsistencies in the officer's explanation that might suggest the supposed fog-line violation was concocted as an excuse to investigate for drugs, but it falls short of requiring extensive testimony that the danger test (established by Ross) would have encouraged. Thus, like current Tenth Circuit case law, Kansas state court decisions offer no special protection against pretextual traffic stops based on fog-line infractions.
175
Although the Kansas courts have provided no special protections from pretextual stops that begin with traffic infractions, the Kansas Supreme Court has imposed one limit on pretextual traffic stops, thereby implicitly recognizing that such stops can, at least sometimes, infringe on Fourth Amendment (and comparable Kansas constitutional) rights. 172. Id. 173. Id. at 612 (stating that an officer must articulate whether or not he knew of circumstances "making it impracticable to stay within lane markers," such as a weather-related issue or a physical object in the lane).
174. See id. at 613 (explaining the testifying officer just needs to give a rendition of what he knew, when he knew it, and "whether the known facts provided him with a reasonable and good faith belief that a traffic infraction had occurred").
175. See id. at 605 (concluding that when an officer can articulate facts demonstrating probable cause to conduct a traffic stop, the seizure is valid even if pretextual).
176. Kansans are protected by both the Fourth Amendment in the federal Constitution and a comparable provision in the Kansas Constitution. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 15 protects Kansans against unreasonable searches and seizures, stating:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons and property against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall be inviolate; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or property to be seized. Unlike some other states' constitutions, which provide citizens with more protection from governmental intrusions on privacy and liberty than does the federal Constitution, the Kansas Kansas officers are prohibited from claiming that there was reason to believe that a citizen needed help and that a stop was conducted for "community caretaking purposes" 177 as a ruse for a drug investigation.
178
As the court noted in State v. Marx, "permitting the public safety rationale to serve as a pretext for an investigative detention runs the risk of emasculating our Fourth Amendment protections."
179
Of course, a similar emasculation argument can be, and has been, made about pretextual traffic stops for minor traffic infractions. As Justice Johnson recently said in his dissent in State v. Greever, a traffic infraction case in which the defendant reportedly failed to signal a turn, "I am concerned about expanding the circumstances under which law enforcement officers are legally permitted to engage in profiling to select targets of investigatory detentions."
180 While acknowledging the holding in Whren, Justice Johnson continued:
In my view, that holding permits an officer to select any particular profile-Hispanics, teenagers, soccer moms, long-haired men, etc.-and target those individuals for seizure to investigate any crime perceived to be prevalent among the particular group, so long as the officer can identify a preceding traffic infraction, no matter how innocuous or esoteric the violation.
181
Justice Johnson's concern that Whren and its Kansas progeny will result in racial (or other arbitrary) profiling is not without factual support. A study published in 2003 concluded that several Kansas police departments were stopping a disproportionate number of black and Hispanic people.
182
Recognizing the detrimental effects of racial profiling, the Kansas legislature has expressly prohibited the practice. 177. See Marx, 215 P.3d at 606 (explaining that the "primary motivation for a valid public safety stop must be for community caretaking purposes"). Despite the intuitive strength of defining Fourth Amendment reasonableness in this way, Whren established a different test, one that expressly rejects any notion that individual officers are precluded from conducting pretextual traffic stops, even if officers choose the targets of their stops by unlawful, even unconstitutional, 186 criteria. If an officer has reason to believe that a driver has violated a traffic regulation, the officer may lawfully stop the car, even if his real desire is to investigate for drug trafficking, gun possession, fraud, or another crime for which he lacks evidence and reasonable suspicion. The Fourth Amendment makes it irrelevant that the officer picks his target based on good looks, color, ethnicity, apparent social status, vehicle type, out-of-state plates, or for some other arbitrary reason, such as harassment. Because Whren permits, if not fosters, racist stops, the decision has been repeatedly criticized.
For instance, scholars have pointed out that Whren may result in the under-enforcement of the law and may cause police to unduly intrude on the privacy and liberty of innocent people of color.
188 As applied to the data gathered for this Article, the under-enforcement argument means that Kansas officers may have discovered more illegality had they been looking for unlawful conduct by all drivers, not just out-of-state cars and cars driven by brown-skinned people. Potentially, the officers' use of stereotypes dulled their senses and caused them to overlook reasonable suspicion in cases of non-Hispanic drivers, resulting in too little enforcement of Caucasian or African-American criminals.
189
On the undue intrusion point, the fog-line data does not account for any of the fog-line traffic stops in which Kansas police searched without finding contraband. Searches during which the police found no drugs are never challenged in criminal court.
190 Therefore, it is likely that the data significantly underrepresents the number of times Kansas officers stopped cars for pretextual reasons, then asked the occupants for, and received permission to search, but found no drugs, guns, or aliens. "[T]he [exclusionary] rule by its very nature only has the potential to address a portion of police violations."
191 As a result, we have no way of knowing how many times Kansas officers relied on stereotypes in conducting a stop and one or more searches that interfered with the liberty and personal privacy of people of color but failed to uncover a crime.
Critics of Whren have also argued that the decision encourages racial profiling and that, in turn, racial profiling undermines faith in the entire criminal justice system. David Harris, one of the prominent experts on racial profiling, has described the consequences this way:
of Police Discretion, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1998) (asserting that Whren rendered the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause "essentially useless" in countering selective enforcement of the law).
188. See Davis, supra note 187, at 427; O'Neill, supra note 45, at 747, 771-72 (reciting literature and studies of "disturbing racial disparities in traffic enforcement" including study of stops throughout Illinois in which officers "utilized consent searches against Hispanic drivers more than twice as often as against Caucasian drivers" although "searches of Caucasians were twice as likely to discover contraband as were the searches of minorities").
189. It has a corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the entire justice system. It deters people of color from cooperating with the police in criminal investigations. And in the courtroom, it causes jurors of all races and ethnicities to doubt the testimony of police officers when they serve as witnesses, making criminal cases more difficult to win.
192
The five fog-line cases show why racial profiling would have this result. Officers in each fog-line case testified about wind and road conditions and lane drifts, but mentioned nothing about skin color, behavior suggesting drug trafficking, or the reliability of stereotypes at predicting crime. The officers rarely mentioned the significance of outof-state plates and even when they did, it was in response to crossexamination. There is no claim by even one Kansas officer that all (or most) drug-traffickers who travel the roads in Kansas are Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Central or South American. None of the officers testified that they saw a driver with brown skin, so they followed the car to look for suspicious behavior that might indicate drug trafficking and, while watching for such behavior, saw the driver deviate from his lane of travel. At least in some of the cases, if not in all of them, this seems to be the reality. Because the pattern of stops suggests that these factorsskin color, vague suspicion of drug trafficking, and out-of-state statusplayed a role, probably a significant one, in all five of the stops that formed the basis of the motions to suppress decided between August 1, 2008 and September 9, 2009, the officers' testimony should mirror these facts, if truthful and forthright.
If the officers were convinced that they acted reasonably by targeting people of color traveling from out of state, or people of Hispanic ethnicity who were driving rental vehicles, why did they avoid the subject and hedge on the reasons for the stops? In at least one case, United States v. Jose Maldonado, 193 the officer expressly denied that race or ethnicity was a factor. 194 Given the Supreme Court's express sanctioning of pretextual stops, why wouldn't Kansas officers candidly testify to the real circumstances for initiating an investigation?
It is possible that the officers did not discuss these reasons because these characteristics did not impact their decisions to stop the cars. Perhaps it is merely a coincidence that all of the fog-line stops involved Hispanic occupants. Given the small sample size, this conclusion is plausible. 195 It is also possible that the officers did not document these reasons and offer them in explanation at the hearings because while skin color and other reasons played some role, they played only a subconscious one in the officers' thinking. Perhaps the officers were not cognizant of their true selection criteria and, therefore, did not document the reasons or testify about them on direct examination. Finally, it is at least equally likely that the officers consciously considered the factors and acted on them, but knowing that the public (and Kansas's district court judges) would be troubled by such seemingly arbitrary and morally-suspect standards for a criminal investigation, the officers struggled to identify other, more palatable bases to stop a car and investigate its occupants. 196 Because Whren allows a seizure for any traffic infraction, officers and prosecutors were not legally obligated to tell the whole story. The government's case can survive a motion to suppress as long as a preponderance of the evidence shows that the officer had some reasonable basis for the stop and that he did not subsequently exceed the scope of reasonableness during a follow-up investigation.
The pattern in Kansas fog-line stops makes it appear that Kansas police are engaging in ethnicity-based profiling. Yet the testimony of Kansas officers fails to explain why such profiles are valid or to explain that the ethnicity of the drivers and occupants was nothing more than a coincidence. Even if the United States Supreme Court precedent makes such an explanation legally irrelevant, the lack of transparency in the officers' testimony causes police to appear dishonest. To the extent police strain to cover up the real reasons for a traffic stop, their testimony will appear contrived and untruthful, creating public and judicial distrust of their otherwise laudable work. Perhaps this taint of untruth explains why the district judges granted 40% of the defendants' motions to suppress in the five fog-line cases.
Finally, if it turns out that discriminatory fog-line police stops in Kansas are not a coincidence and that they reflect a police policy of discrimination, the stops may be unconstitutional notwithstanding 195 . It is less plausible, however, given that many of the published Tenth Circuit decisions also appear to involve Hispanic defendants.
196. See Harris, supra note 187, at 19 ("Pretextual traffic stops fuel the belief that the police are not only unfair and biased, but untruthful as well. Each pretextual traffic stop involves an untruth, and both the officer and the driver recognize this. . . . Stopping a driver for a traffic offense when the officer's real purpose is drug interdiction is a lie-a legally sanctioned one, to be sure, but a lie nonetheless."). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
Whren.
197
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that an individual officer's conduct will be judged by an objective, Fourth Amendment standard, the Court has yet to decide that programmatic motives are irrelevant in the investigation of criminal conduct. If police departments within Kansas encourage or acquiesce in a policy to follow and investigate Hispanic drivers as a pretext for drug investigations, the principles of Whren do not apply.
198
Whren did not hold that law enforcement agencies act "reasonably" when they adopt discriminatory policies governing investigations. Arguably, programmatic motives should and do matter, even in traffic stops, and even after Whren.
As Although Edmond too is readily distinguishable from the typical fog-line case because it concerned the legality of a suspicionless roadblock, the principles of Edmond should extend to cases in which every member of a police department is expected to pursue, follow, and investigate cars tagged from out-of-state but ignore those who cross the fog line but bear a Kansas tag. The principles of Edmond should also apply to a police policy that encourages all officers to stop disproportionate numbers of Hispanic drivers in an effort to catch drug dealers. As the Court indicated in Edmond, "cases dealing with intrusions that occur pursuant to a general scheme absent individualized suspicion have often required an inquiry into purpose at the programmatic level." 198. Because Kansas requires a written policy prohibiting racial profiling, it will be difficult to prove that a department's actual policy is different. Nevertheless, a department may condone profiling informally or train their officers in ways that promote discriminatory stops notwithstanding a formal and written policy to the contrary. The 2003 study showing that multiple police departments in Kansas were engaging in discriminatory stops is evidence that officers may be acting pursuant to such a police custom, culture, or "policy," even if the policy is informal and contrary to the department's written policy. See n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (indicating that bad faith and the lack of a pure investigative purpose mattered to the validity of an inventory search, a search that does not rest on reasonable suspicion or probable cause).
show a pattern of stopping cars with no intention of ticketing the drivers, suggests that some police departments within Kansas may have programmatic policies encouraging officers to investigate certain types of cars and drivers for drugs, regardless of suspicion. If so, these policies should be governed by cases limiting suspicionless seizures and searches of drivers and cars. Thus, under the reasoning of Edmond, such suspicionless investigations violate the Fourth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
In Whren, the United States Supreme Court sanctioned pretextual traffic stops. In practice the holding of Whren condones police investigations that target certain suspect classes of people, like Hispanics, for increased police scrutiny. In permitting pretextual stops, the Court ignored the risk that such practices will encourage police to distort the truth, overlooked the cost of under-enforcement of the laws, and ignored the consequences to the criminal justice system of race and ethnicity based discrimination.
Kansas law exacerbates these risks by making fog-line stops a model for protecting ulterior motives from a sifting judicial inquiry. In Kansas, it makes no difference that every driver occasionally crosses the fog line or that an individual driver left his lane without presenting any danger to another person, object, or animal. As long as a Kansas officer can credibly testify that the weather and road conditions made it practicable to stay within a single lane but that the driver did not, the officer has grounds for a stop, which gives him a chance to ask to search.
Despite Kansas officers' apparent practice of stopping certain cars and certain people, claiming that the cars left their primary lane of travel, and notwithstanding that federal and Kansas law make fog-line infractions easy to prove, judges in the District of Kansas have granted 40% of motions to suppress evidence in recent fog-line cases. The relative success of defendants at suppressing evidence in these cases should cause Kansas police to question the effectiveness of pretextual fog-line stops, especially given the risk that the public will perceive pretextual stops as motivated by skin color and ethnicity and considering the evidence from other states that discriminatory searches are counterproductive in uncovering crime.
